Nuclear Proliferation:  Dim Prospects for Control by Fernandez, Diana L. W.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 3
1976
Nuclear Proliferation: Dim Prospects for Control
Diana L. W. Fernandez
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Diana L. Fernandez, Nuclear Proliferation: Dim Prospects for Control, 3 Brook. J. Int'l L. (1976).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol3/iss1/3
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: DIM PROSPECTS FOR
CONTROL
INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been an interna-
tional concern since atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in 1945. Attempts at controlling horizontal
proliferation' can be viewed as falling into three phases. The
United States, Great Britain, and Canada attempted to maintain
a monopoly on nuclear technology during the first phase. This
attempted monopoly, however, was abruptly broken in 1949 when
the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear device.2 It was followed
by Great Britain in 1952,3 and by France and China in 1960 and
1964, ' respectively.
The policy of the United States during this second phase of
nuclear proliferation was articulated by President Eisenhower in
his Atoms for Peace Speech in 1953,1 in which he stated that the
United States would make available to other nations the benefits
of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Important developments of
this era included the establishment of the International Atomic
Energy Agency [hereinafter referred to as IAEA], the acceptance
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty [hereinafter referred to as
NPT], and the establishment and implementation of IAEA safe-
guards.
The international community has moved into a third phase
with India's detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1974, and the
emergence of several more nations on the verge of independent
nuclear capability, including countries in volatile political areas,
such as Israel7 and Taiwan." The technology involved in the de-
velopment and use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes is eas-
ily convertible into an armament program. Furthermore, a neces-
1. Horizontal proliferation refers to the increase in the number of countries possessing
nuclear weapons; vertical proliferation has been defined as quantitative and qualitative
increases in weapons held by nuclear States. G. FISCHER, THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 20-21 (D. Wiley transl. 1971).
2. PUGWASH CONFERENCES ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS, PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 274 (C. Barnaby ed. 1969) (Pugwash Monograph 1).
3. Id.
4. W. WENTZ, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 5 (1968).
5. Id.
6. 8 U.N. GAOR 450-52 (1953), PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 256 (1960) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC PAPERS].
7. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
8. Id., Aug. 30, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
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sary by-product of a nuclear reactor system is plutonium, the
basic fissionable material necessary for weapon development.' As
Willrich points out,
[a] conclusion of fundamental importance arises from this fact:
the increasing use of nuclear energy primarily to generate
electric power will greatly complicate the task of preventing
nuclear weapons proliferation.'"
It is the potential for development of a nuclear weapon capability
from peaceful uses of nuclear energy which requires that restric-
tions be placed on the free transfer of nuclear materials. Whether
the world can exist with the nuclear technology it has created will
be determined in this last phase.
This note will first consider the historical development of the
concept of non-proliferation, centering on United States initia-
tives. The NPT, the most important treaty in this area, will be
analyzed. Recent developments in the field will be examined at
the conclusion of the analysis.
I. THE FIRST PHASE: SECRECY
The first phase in the area of nuclear proliferation is of his-
torical significance only. During that phase, the three countries
then possessing nuclear technology, the United States, Great
Britain, and Canada, attempted to maintain a monopoly on that
knowledge until an international organization could be estab-
lished to oversee its dissemination solely for peaceful purposes. In
November 1945, following the bombing of Hiroshima and Naga-
saki in August of that year, the United States joined with Great
Britain and Canada in a three-power declaration prohibiting the
disclosure of atomic energy information until the establishment
of an international system of control." All efforts at this time were
directed toward an overall goal of maintaining the secret of nu-
clear technology, with little if any concern for its peaceful uses.
In the international sphere, this resulted in the introduction
of the Baruch Plan at the United Nations in 1946.12 The plan
9. M. WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 17 (1969); SENATE COMM. ON GOVERN-
MENT OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., lST SESS., PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND WEAPONS PRO-
LIFERATION: A COMPENDIUM 14 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM].
10. M. WILLRICH, NoN-PROLIFERATION TREATY 17 (1969).
11. Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy by the President of the United States, the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister of Canada, Nov. 15,1945,
60 Stat. 1479, T.I.A.S. No. 1504, 3 U.N.T.S. 123.
12. For a general discussion of the Baruch Plan, see B. BECHHOEFER, POSTWAR NEoO-
TIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL 35-82 (1961).
[Vol. IfIIl
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
would have established an independent international authority
with regulatory powers over all uses of atomic energy throughout
the world. In addition, nuclear activities potentially dangerous to
world security would have been under the direct managerial con-
trol of the authority, and all other nuclear activities would be
individually licensed by. the authority and subject to its control
and inspection. The international agency would also have had the
duty to foster the beneficial use of nuclear energy. 13 In order to
effectuate the Baruch Plan, the United States, which at that time
was the only country actually possessing nuclear weapons, would
have agreed to stop its manufacture of atomic bombs and to
dispose of its existing stockpile. 4
The Baruch Plan was the first attempt to negotiate an agree-
ment controlling nuclear energy. However, its major flaw was the
failure of its makers to recognize the possibility that another
country could develop nuclear capability before an international
agency could be established. When the Russians exploded their
first nuclear device in 1949, the plan became academic. Yet the
Baruch Plan, although unworkable, resulted in some important
consequences because of its broad enunciation of Western policy
and its disclosure of Soviet attitudes and techniques. 5
Domestically, attention during this period was focused upon
preventing the spread of nuclear-weapons technology; the promo-
tion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was relegated to a secon-
dary position. The McMahon Act, passed by Congress in 194616
and since superseded by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,1 re-
flected the Government's desire to safeguard the monopoly it held
on all domestic reactors and production facilities, as well as own-
ership of all enriched uranium and plutonium within the United
States.
Both the Baruch Plan and the McMahon Act were part of a
general policy of the United States to maintain the secret of nu-
clear technology until an international system could be estab-
lished. The rationale underlying this desire to maintain a monop-
oly was stated by Representative Thomason during Congressional
debate on the conference report on the McMahon Act:
13. Id.
14. M. WiLLRicH, supra note 10, at 1.
15. B. BECHHOEFER, supra note 12, at 41-42.
16. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970).
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Every member [of the Conference Committee] had one big
objective and that was to tie up the secret of the atomic
bomb. . . . [F]or the time being, at least until we know what
we are going to do with this terrible weapon and this tremendous
secret discovery, . . . there is nothing in the world to do except
to give the Government the monopoly that it must have."8
In order to maintain this secret, the McMahon Act prohibited
private individuals from owning nuclear material or controlling
facilities capable of producing significant quantities of these ma-
terials within the United States. 9 The Act also forbade the com-
munication of both military and industrial information since no
international control system existed.2" "[T]his law put a tempo-
rary stop to all exchanges of information and all cooperation be-
tween the United States and other countries including Great
Britain."2 1
II. THE SECOND PHASE: ATOMS FOR PEACE
As the potential for peaceful uses of atomic energy became
evident, the United States embarked upon a new phase of nuclear
policy. President Eisenhower, in his first inaugural address,
enunciated the general outline of his disarmament program. 2
Soon after, Eisenhower proposed international control of all at-
omic energy and the promotion of its use only for peaceful pur-
poses.Y The first statement of this policy before an international
forum occurred on December 8, 1953, with President Eisen-
hower's famous Atoms for Peace Speech before the United Na-
tions General Assembly.24 It marked the beginning of a road that
ended in the establishment of the IAEA and the completion of the
NPT, which together constitute the framework of the present
international controls over nuclear materials.
A. Atomic Energy Act
Domestically, this policy resulted in the passage of the At-
18. 92 CONG. REc. 10,194 (1946) (remarks of Representative Thomason).
19. See Spingarn, The International Supply of Nuclear Materials, in INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, EXPERIENCE AND TRENDS IN NUCLEAR LAW 55 (Legal Ser. No. 8,
1972).
20. See G. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 21-22.
21. Id. at 22.
22. Pusuc PAPERS 1 (Inaugural Address).
23. Id. at 50 (Chance for Peace Speech).
24. 8 U.N. GAOR 450-52 (1953), PUBUC PAPERS 256.
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omic Energy Act of 1954,25 which has made available to cooperat-
ing nations the benefits of peaceful application of nuclear energy.
The Act authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission to enter into
"agreements for cooperation" with other nations concerning the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy without Senate approval.26 How-
ever, each such agreement is required to contain a guarantee by
the cooperating nation "that any material to be transferred pur-
suant to such agreement will not be used for atomic weapons, or
for research on or development of atomic weapons or any other
military purpose. 27 Between 1955 and 1958, bilateral agreements
involving the transfer of research and power reactors were con-
cluded with forty-three nations in addition to exchanges of
technology and personnel.28 This greatly facilitated the participa-
tion of American industry in atomic power activities abroad. In
addition, the Act sanctions international nuclear activities by
private industries if carried out under the umbrella of a
government-to-government compact which includes a non-
diversion guarantee. 9
United States policy under the Atoms for Peace Program and
the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, encouraging the transfer of nuclear
technology and material, has proved to be a major cause of the
proliferation of nuclear weapons."
25. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975). Section 2153 provides:
No cooperation with any nation. . . shall be undertaken until-
(d) Submission to the Congress.
The proposed agreement for cooperation, together with the approval and
determination of the President . . . has been submitted to the Congress and
referred to the Joint Committee [on Atomic Energy] and a period of sixty days
has elapsed while Congress is in session. . . but any such proposed agreement
...shall not become effective if. . .Congress passes a concurrent resolution
stating in substance that it does not favor the proposed agreement for coopera-
tion ....
42 U.S.C. § 2153(d) (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(3) (1970). See Bechhoefer, Historical Evolution of Interna-
tional Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 24 (M. Willrich
ed. 1973).
28. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs
of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., app. at 294 (1975)
(Nuclear Proliferation: Future U.S. Foreign Policy Implications) [hereinafter cited as
1975 Hearings].
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1970).
30. See Hearings on "Nonproliferation" Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Ir-
ternational Organizations, and Security Agreements of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (Feb. 23, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Feb. 23,
19761. However, Dr. Ikle has qualified this assertion:
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Ironically, the objective of non-proliferation has been served by
proclamations and policy and by United States actions at Ge-
neva and the United Nations, while at the same time being
violated by the rapid diffusion of nuclear technology, materials,
and related hardware-mostly with federal approval and
assistance."u
Congress amended the Act in 1964 to permit the private own-
ership of special nuclear materials.2 United States policy since
that time has focused upon agreements for cooperation which
allow for the exchange of technical information, the supply of
nuclear materials, and the availability of United States enrich-
ment services for foreign countries.13
B. The International Atomic Energy Agency
The IAEA, headquartered in Vienna, Austria, is a self-
governing organization established in 1957 under the auspices of
the United Nations.34 It was an outgrowth of the Atoms for Peace
proposal made by President Eisenhower in 1953, in which he
called for "international control of atomic energy to promote its
use for peaceful purposes only .. . [and] adequate safeguards,
including a practical system of inspection under the United
Nations. 35
The Statute, which established the main function of the
IAEA, is actually a treaty, to which 108 States were parties as of
January 1, 1976. 31 In addition to laying the framework of the
There is no question that nuclear technology would have spread in any
event-the question is how fast. In the 1950s this rather practical question was
being confused with more philosophic issues of science and secrecy: whether
scientific discoveries could be kept secret and, indeed, whether it was morally
right to keep them secret, would that be possible.
COMPENDIUM 104.
31. W. WENTZ, NUCLEAR PROUFERATION 1 (1968).
32. Act of August 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-489, 78 Stat. 602. See Bechhoefer, supra
note 27, at 25.
33. Enriched material contains the percentage of a given isotope artificially in-
creased. "Enriched uranium contains more of the fissionable isotope uranium-235 than
the naturally occurring percentage (0.7 percent)." F. BARNABY, THE NUCLEAR AE 140
(1974). See Spingarn, supra note 19, at 58-59. See also Boskma, Uranium Enrichment
Technologies and the Demand for Enriched Uranium, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATIONS
PROBLEMS 56-68 (B. Jasani ed. 1974).
34. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T.
1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective July 29, 1957), as amended, done Oct.
4, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 135, T.I.A.S. No. 5284, 471 U.N.T.S. 334 (effective Jan. 31, 1963)
[hereinafter cited as Statute].
35. 8 U.N. GAOR 450-52 (1953), PuBuc PAPERS 256.
36. TREATIES IN FORCE 317 (1976).
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Agency in Articles IV through VII, the Statute establishes as a
function of the Agency the administration of safeguards.17 These
safeguards were designed to ensure that fissionable materials and
nuclear equipment supplied by or through the Agency would not
be utilized for military purposes. Also, safeguards would be ap-
plied at the request of the parties to any bilateral or multilateral
agreement.3 1
The Statute clearly indicates that the dangers inherent in
the use of nuclear energy were foreseen by its drafters. Article II
of the Statute provides:
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution
of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the
world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance pro-
vided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control
is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose."
The Statute illustrates an apparent dichotomy. While attempt-
ing to insure the peaceful application of atomic energy the Stat-
ute also charges the IAEA with safeguarding against the diversion
of fissionable material from peaceful purposes to nuclear wea-
ponry without giving the IAEA mandatory powers of enforce-
ment. 0
The IAEA Statute does not require any member of the Agency
to submit to safeguards. . . nor does it require that states make
their international assistance or transfers subject to the recipi-
ent's acceptance of such controls. In short, the Statute merely
creates a framework for controls within which member states
can decide whether to submit and, if so, to what controls."
Another inherent weakness in the framework is that the IAEA is
largely run by countries that desire nuclear information but not
intervention by nuclear countries.42
C. The Non-Proliferation Treaty
The origins of the NPT 3 can be traced to the unanimous
37. Statute art. I, para. (A)(5).
38. Id.
39. Szasz, International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFE-
GUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 75 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
40. Statute art. II.
41. Firmage, The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 711, 715 (1969).
42. See COMPENDIUM 105.
43. Done July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (effective
Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter cited as NPTI.
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adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of a resolution
proposed by Ireland in 1961.11 The resolution called for an agree-
ment whereby
nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing
control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the informa-
tion necessary for their manufacture to states not possessing
such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing
nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or other-
wise acquire control of such weapons."
On June 12, 1968, the United Nations General Assembly
commended the resulting Treaty in a resolution8 adopted by a
vote of 95-4, with 21 abstentions.4" It was opened for signature
on July 1, 1968. The NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970,
when it had been ratified, in accordance with Article IX of the
Treaty, by the three States whose governments were appointed
depositories" and by more than forty other signatories.
The NPT is composed of eleven articles. Article I refers only
to the obligations of nuclear weapon parties, and states that they
may not transfer nuclear devices to any State, nor assist a non-
nuclear weapon State in acquiring or controlling nuclear devices.
The second article sets forth the major obligations of non-nuclear
weapon parties: they may not actually receive or acquire control
over nuclear devices, nor manufacture them with or without
assistance. Article III, the safeguard provision, is intended to pro-
vide verification of the fulfillment of the parties' obligations
under Article I and II. Safeguards must be applied to all source
or special fissionable material in or under the control of non-
nuclear weapon parties.
Under Article V, the benefits of peaceful applications of
44. G.A. Res. 1665, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4980/Add.1 (1961).
45. Id. (citations omitted). See generally Smith, NATO Nuclear Information.
Sharing Arrangements and the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Collective Defense Confronts
Arms Control, 13 ATOMic ENERGY L.J. 331, 342 (1972).
46. 22 U.N. GAOR Annexes, Agenda Item 27, A/7016/Add.1, at 8 (1968).
47. M. WILLRICH, supra note 10, at 64.
48. The Limited Test Ban Treaty introduced a new diplomatic practice: the estab-
lishment of more than one depository. In this case the depositories were the three original
parties to the Treaty: the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. This allows
a State not recognized by one of the original parties to be bound by signing and depositing
its instrument of ratification with another original party. G. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 129-
30.
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nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear weapon
parties under appropriate international procedures and observa-
tion. Article VI obligates all parties to pursue effective measures
to cease the nuclear arms race and move toward nuclear disarma-
ment. States are granted the right to establish nuclear free zones
by Article VIIY9
Article X allows for withdrawal from the NPT provided that
the party determines that extraordinary events relating to the
treaty's subject matter have jeopardized the country's supreme
interests. Three months notice to the other parties and the
Security Council is required. Although theoretically the Security
Council could impose sanctions upon a withdrawing party, the
composition of the Security Council makes this possibility un-
likely." The only conceivable effective sanction would be the ad-
49. The nuclear free zone concept is an attempt to limit the spread of nuclear weap-
ons while still allowing for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Since international security
on a world-wide scale is difficult to organize, efforts on a regional level have become a
viable alternative to deal with the security problem.
There have been five major nuclear free zone treaties. The first such treaty bound
the signatory nations to restrict their nuclear activities in Antarctica to peaceful purposes
and provides for inspection of Antarctic stations by the signatory nations. Antarctic
Treaty, signed Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (effective
June 23, 1961).
The second major nuclear free zone treaty demilitarized the moon and other celestial
bodies and denuclearized that part of outer space under exploration. Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No.
6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Oct. 10, 1967).
The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43
(effective Oct. 10, 1963), was directed toward eliminating atmospheric pollution and
radioactive fallout.
The next treaty attempting to establish a nuclear free zone was the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 (effective May 12,
1971). This treaty marked an important step since it attempted for the first time to ban
nuclear weapons in a populated area. Although the treaty refers only to Latin America, it
endeavors to ban nuclear weapons completely from that region. The fifth major nuclear
free zone treaty is the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Employment of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the
Subsoil Thereof, done Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337 (effective May 18,
1972).
See PUGWASH CONFERENCES ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS, PREVENTING THE SPREAD
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 332-43 (C. Barnaby ed. 1969) (Pugwash Monograph 1).
50. Two requirements must be fulfilled before the Security Council can take any
action. The measure must be supported by nine members, and the veto of any of the five
permanent members must not be invoked. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. The five perma-
nent members are China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Id. at art. 23, para. 1. See generally W. EPSTEIN, THE LAST CHANCE: NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION AND ARms CONTROL 142 (1976).
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verse publicity generated by withdrawal from the treaty.5'
Non-nuclear weapon countries have criticized the treaty for
providing no assurance that nuclear weapon countries will carry
out their obligation to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear
explosions5 2 on a non-discriminatory basis and at the lowest possi-
ble cost.53 Although the IAEA has begun to seriously consider
implementing this provision, thus far the Agency has only estab-
lished an ad hoc advisory group. 4 In addition, the NPT's promo-
tion of the peaceful use of nuclear explosions has been attacked
because "the danger of subsequent radioactive contamination of
the environment is very real; the problem of designing a 'clean'
explosive has still not been solved. '55
It is ironic that the NPT contains all the measures for nuclear
disarmament which the nuclear weapon States have been unable
to agree upon in over twenty years of negotiations and that those
States would expect these measures to be applied prospectively
to the non-nuclear weapon States.5
The Treaty is intended to prohibit any sixth state from
acquiring nuclear weapons and to foreclose the possibility of
transferring nuclear weapons to multilateral structures, even
though no increase would occur in the number of powers in the
global system having control of nuclear weapons. The Treaty
also inescapably implies that, in a world limited to five nuclear-
weapon states, non-nuclear-weapon states will have to rely for
the indefinite future on one or more nuclear-weapon states as
guarantors of their security against nuclear aggression."
In questioning whether the NPT has accomplished its pur-
poses more must be examined than whether all potential nuclear
weapon States become parties. "To the extent that the treaty
creates a climate in which a state does not sign for one of a
number of reasons but, nevertheless, decides not to develop nu-
clear weapons, the treaty has fulfilled most of its functions.""
51. Ehrlich, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives,
56 VA. L. REV. 587, 588 (1970).
52. Id. at 595.
53. NPT art. V.
54. INTERNATIONAL AToMIc ENERGY AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT, 1 JULY 1974-30 JUNE
1975, at 9 (1975).
55. Emelyanov, On the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Explosions, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERA-
TION PROBLEMS 215 (B. Jasani ed. 1974).
56. M. WILLRICH, supra note 10, at 98.
57. Id. at 178.
58. Fisher, Global Dimensions, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL 7
(B. Boskey & M. Willrich eds. 1970).
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The Treaty also provides a legal framework to assist the in-
ternational community in mastering nuclear technology. "The
Treaty could become a constitutional document in the construc-
tion of a world order in which the risks of nuclear conflagrations
are successfully contained while the benefits of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy are widely available."59
In an attempt to influence non-nuclear countries to become
parties to the NPT, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Soviet Union stated before the Security Council on June 17,
1968,60 that they would guarantee the security of non-nuclear par-
ties to the NPT.6 ' Each of these nations, in identical statements,
announced its intention, in the event of the aggressive use of
nuclear weapons or the threat of aggression against a non-nuclear
State, to act expediently through the Security Council and give
immediate assistance to the victim nation. 2 The statement also
confirmed the natural right of self-defense, recognized by Article
51 of the United Nations Charter." On June 19, 1968, the Security
Council approved a resolution64 which manifested the intention
expressed by these countries that they would assist any non-
nuclear country threatened by the use of nuclear weapons.6 5
The major purpose of the statements and the Security Coun-
cil resolution was to offer the non-nuclear weapon States the secu-
rity assurances that they claimed were lacking in the NPT. Al-
though at first there had been some question as to whether a non-
nuclear State need be a party to the NPT before it could invoke
59. M. WILLRICH, supra note 10, at 3-4.
60. 23 U.N. SCOR, 1430th meeting 1-7 (1968).
61. Id. A portion of the United States declaration reads as follows:
"Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against
a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which
the nuclear-weapon States which are permanent members of the . . .Security
Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the
measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggres-
sion ....
"The United States affirms its intention, as a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to
provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon
State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is
a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which
nuclear weapons are used.
Id. at 5.
62. Id. at 3-5.
63. Id.
64. S.C. Res. 255 (1968), RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 13,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1970).
65. Id.
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the Resolution," it is now clear that the assurances extend only
to parties to the NPT. 7
The Resolution has been criticized as containing two impor-
tant weaknesses. First, the determination whether aggression
with nuclear weapons has occurred will be made by the normal
Security Council voting procedures, which gives veto power to
any of the five permanent Council members.68 Second, the form
of the security guarantees has been criticized because these guar-
antees are merely unilateral statements rather than a part of the
NPT.6 9 Had they been stated in the actual body of the NPT "the
guarantees would have had the character of a legal obligation,
and their value, both politically and psychologically, would have
been considerably enhanced."70
D. Safeguards
The IAEA began administering international safeguards in
1960 through individual agreements with over twenty countries
before the NPT was commended by the United Nations in 1968.1'
In part, this was a result of the United States policy, begun in
1962, of transferring to the IAEA the responsibility for adminis-
tering the safeguards under the United States bilateral agree-
ments for cooperation,72 as well as the parallel efforts of Great
Britain and Canada. 73
Article HI of the NPT contains a specific provision that safe-
guards be managed by the IAEA. Its sole purpose is to prevent
diversion to military purposes of nuclear materials used by non-
nuclear weapon States.74 The safeguard system is basically an
66. Lefensky, The United Nations Security Council Resolution on Security
Assurances for Non-Nuclear Weapon States, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 56, 59 (1970).
67. M. WILLRICH, supra note 10, at 172.
68. Id. at 169-70.
69. G. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 147.
70. Id.
71. Smyth, The Need for International Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 18 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
72. M. WILLRICH, supra note 10, at 58-59.
73. Id.
74. Firmage, supra note 41, at 711, 724-25. Under Article Ill, all non-nuclear weapon
States party to the Treaty are required to conclude, individually or together with other
States, a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [hereinafter
referred to as IAEA] covering all their peaceful nuclear activities. All parties to the Treaty
must agree not to provide nuclear materials, or specialized equipment such as reactors,
to non-nuclear countries unless the material included is subject to safeguards.
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administrative process; the IAEA compares information concern-
ing the facilities provided by the country with the independent
physical verification performed by the Agency.75 A sliding scale
of frequency for required reports and inspections is established
above the exemption limit for militarily insignificant amounts.
At a certain point, access to the facilities at all times must be
permitted. 6
There are several areas of nuclear transactions outside the
scope of the safeguard system. Safeguards are not required for
peaceful nuclear activities carried out within nuclear States; the
rationale is that the purpose of non-proliferation is not met in
such instances. However, this has been criticized as another dis-
criminatory provision of the NPT, creating differing responsibili-
ties and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear parties to
the Treaty.77
Safeguards are inapplicable to transactions entered into ex-
pressly for non-weapon military purposes, such as for use in a
naval propulsion reactor program or a nuclear weapons research
program which stops short of the manufacture of weapons.78 The
safeguard system would in addition fail to detect a clandestine
weapons production system. Finally, there is no way to insure
compliance with the basic provisions of Articles I and II of the
NPT relating to the non-transfer or receipt of nuclear weapons.79
However, the safeguard system may be credited with per-
forming its function without having created any major diplomatic
disputes. The safeguards must insure the highest degree of con-
fidence that no diversion occurs, yet simultaneously the IAEA
In addition, States conducting an international transfer of nuclear supplies or assis-
tance may independently request IAEA coverage. Also, States party to the NPT can
request that IAEA administer safeguards at particular facilities or over their entire nuclear
program. Finally, parties to regional arrangements may request safeguard coverage to
verify treaty compliance.
In order to complete their agreements with the non-nuclear weapon States as quickly
and uniformly as possible after the NPT came into effect, the IAEA created a safeguard
committee to formulate guidelines for these agreements. Over forty-seven countries ac-
tually participated in the work of the committee from June 1970 to May 1971. They
produced a document entitled The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the
Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT, 1 JULY 1974-
30 JUNE 1975, at 39 (1975).
75. M. WILLRICH, supra note 10, at 58.
76. Id. at 121 n.42.
77. Id. at 102.
78. Id. at 120.
79. Firmage, supra note 41, at 725.
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and the inspectors must carefully take into consideration sensi-
tivities relating to national sovereignty. 0 This is a difficult diplo-
matic problem which, it appears, the Agency has handled
exceptionally well.
This safeguard system performs the useful function of check-
ing for diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful nuclear pro-
grams. However, it can be seriously questioned as an effective
restraint on nuclear proliferation due to the lack of any
enforcement provision. In addition, it fails to deal with other
possible problem areas, such as the physical protection of nuclear
materials.
III. THE THIRD PHASE: UNCERTAINTY
The direction the present phase will take is still uncertain.
The pause in vertical proliferation has ended and the threat of a
drastic increase in the number of nuclear-armed countries seems
imminent.8'
A. India
India has clearly indicated its opposition to the NPT by re-
fusing to sign it and has specifically stated its concern with the
safeguards system.
Institution of international controls on peaceful reactors
and power stations is like an attempt to maintain law and order
in a society by placing all its law-abiding citizens in custody
while leaving its law-breaking elements free to roam the streets
... . Reactors engaged in peaceful pursuits, and atomic power
stations of the developing countries, do not in themselves pose
any threat to the security of the international society.
India's disregard for the NPT was further demonstrated by
its detonation of a nuclear device on May 18, 1974, in the desert
area of Rajasthan, approximately forty miles from the Indo-
Pakistani border.8 3 This detonation focused attention on the
problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons since India was
the first nation to develop weapons from a peaceful nuclear pro-
80. 1975 Hearings, app. at 272-73.
81. See generally 122 CONG. REC. S18,062 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Senator
Percy).
82. Statement by Representative of India to Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Conference, quoted in M. WILLmICH, supra note 10, at 124.
83. 4 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 237 (1974).
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gram. For ten years a climate had existed in which nations with
the economic and technical capability for producing nuclear
weapons had voluntarily abstained from developing them. 4 India
became the sixth nation to demonstrate nuclear weapon capabil-
ity and thus abruptly altered that climate.
India's decision magnified the numerous failings of the NPT
and its lack of effective control over proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. At the time of the explosion, there had been much debate
as to whether the NPT represented customary international law
binding even those States not parties to the Treaty. It had been
in effect for more than three years and over one hundred countries
had acceded to it. However, the measure of whether a multilat-
eral treaty has reached the level of customary international law
has been described by Richard Baxter as follows:
The process of establishing the state of customary international
law is one of demonstrating what States consider to be the mea-
sure of their obligations. The actual conduct of States in their
relations with other nations is only a subsidiary means whereby
the rules which guide the conduct of States are ascertained. The
firm statement by the State of what it considers to be the rule
offers better evidence of its position than what can be pieced
together from the actions of that country at different times and
in a variety of contexts."5
India has clearly articulated its position regarding the NPT.
Its decision to develop nuclear weapons was based upon three
arguments. First, the NPT is discriminatory and therefore has no
legal effect upon non-parties to the treaty. Second, India has
made a distinction between nuclear weapons for peaceful pur-
poses and those used for military purposes. These first two argu-
ments would not seem to seriously affect the establishment of
customary international law in this area, since treaties are not
required to be non-discriminatory," and only a few other coun-
tries adhere to India's distinction regarding nuclear weapons for
peaceful uses.88 India's third rationalization probably creates the
greatest threat of non-adherence to the NPT. India believes that
84. 1975 Hearings, app. at 274.
85. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Lau, 41
BAiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275, 300 (1968).
86. 4 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 237, 247-50 (1974).
87. L.F. CHEN, STATE SUCCESSION RELATING TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 28 (1974), citing E.
DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 194 (J. Chitty transl. 1858).
88. 4 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. at 250.
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as a matter of self-defense it is entitled to maintain a military
option in addition to its peaceful nuclear energy program. 9
This rationale is probably the most compelling reason for
non-compliance with the provisions of the NPT. India, as well as
non-nuclear weapon States, is not convinced that the Security
Council would honor its commitment to act in the event of
nuclear aggression. 0 Without complete faith in that assurance,
those States seriously threatened by aggression will attempt to
follow India's lead. The volatile relationship between India and
both Pakistan and China was a major consideration in its deci-
sion to join the group of nuclear weapon States. Israel and Tai-
wan find themselves in analogous situations.
B. Recent Developments
The first five-year review conference of the NPT was held in
May 1975, as required by Article VII(3) of that treaty. In Febru-
ary 1976, the United States Government, through the executive
branch and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, an-
nounced the convening of a number of bilateral and multilateral
discussions with nuclear suppliers to develop common rules on
safeguards and export controls. Finally, a bill entitled the Export
Reorganization Act of 1976 was introduced into Congress."
The Review Conference
It had been predicted that the first review conference of the
NPT might be used by non-nuclear weapon States to lay the
foundation for their later withdrawal from the Treaty." However,
in actuality it had the opposite effect. There had been virtually
no movement toward adherence to the NPT since the Indian
nuclear explosion in 1974; however, immediately preceeding the
Conference, the Treaty was ratified by Belgium, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and
was submitted to the Japanese Diet for ratification. 3 During the
Conference, the NPT was ratified by three additional countries. 4
89. Id. at 248.
90. Id. at 251.
91. S. 1439, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
92. See Bunn, Horizontal Proliferation, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR
CONTROL 34 (B. Boskey & M. Willrich eds. 1970).
93. 1975 Hearings, app. at 273-74. The Japanese Diet has since approved it for ratifi-
cation. Statement of President Ford, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRS. DoC. 937 (May 24, 1976).
94. 1975 Hearings, app. at 274.
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The Conference reaffirmed support for the NPT and urged
universal adherence. It was recommended that supplier States
strengthen common export requirements and that IAEA safe-
guards be strengthened and universally applied. The Conference
recognized that regional or multinational fuel-cycle centers may
be an advantageous way to meet the nuclear power need of many
States and also concluded that particular recommendations for
the physical protection of nuclear materials be elaborated.
9 5
These statements did not create any drastic changes in the
area of non-proliferation. They mainly serve as an assessment of
the present status of non-proliferation and a setting of guidelines
for future action. This leaves the IAEA to effectuate these goals,
and unfortunately there is no indication that it will promptly take
the necessary actions.
Nuclear Suppliers' Agreement
In February 1976, the United States Government revealed
that a number of nuclear supplier countries,98 including itself,
had reached an agreement over common guidelines for exporting
nuclear material.97 These guidelines included:
Provisions for the application of IAEA safeguards on ex-
ports of material, equipment and technology;
Prohibitions against using assistance for any nuclear explo-
sions including those for "peaceful purposes;"
Requirements for physical security measures on nuclear
equipment and materials;
Application of restraint in the transfer of sensitive technolo-
gies (such as enrichment and reprocessing);
Encouragement of multinational regional facilities for re-
processing and enrichment; and
Special conditions governing the use or retransfer of sensi-
tive material, equipment and technology.9"
95. The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of-
Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, pt. 1, annex I, at 1-10, U.N. Doc. No. NPT/CONF/
35/1 (1975).
96. Though the United States Government did not release the name or number of
countries involved, the New York Times stated that Canada, China, Japan, the Soviet
Union, and the United Kingdom were involved. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1976, at 1, col. 8.
97. Id.
98. Statement of Secretary of State Kissinger, Hearings on S. 1439 Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 769 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as 1976 Hearings]. The nuclear suppliers met again in June 1976 and were to have recon-
vened in late 1976 to review their progress. However, no information on these meetings or
their results has been made public. S. Rep. No. 94-1193, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
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The immediate problem with these guidelines is that they
have no legal status but are merely unilateral declarations by the
participating nations. Their validity is dependent upon the indi-
vidual actions of the participants. It is highly questionable
whether all the countries involved will abide by the policy set
forth in the guidelines, and thus whether they will achieve their
stated goal, i.e., "to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons while
permitting nuclear exports of equipment to meet the world's
growing energy needs."99
S. 1439-The Export Reorganization Act of 1976
As one of the major suppliers of peaceful nuclear
technology,"'0 actions by the United States in the field of nuclear
exports can have a profound effect on proliferation. The first step
toward limiting nuclear proliferation was taken in 1974 with the
enactment of the Energy Reorganization Act'°' which attempted
to strengthen the institutional check against unwise nuclear ex-
port actions. The Act abolished the Atomic Energy Commission
and separated its functions into two new governmental agencies
-the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [hereinafter referred to
as NRC] and the Energy Research and Development Adminis-
tration.
Senators Glenn, Percy, and Ribicoff introduced S. 143912 on
April 15, 1975 to remedy several deficiencies in the Energy
Reorganization Act.0 3 The bill was completely revised on May 13,
1976 and reprinted.0 The overall purpose of the bill was to reor-
ganize the federal government's nuclear export structure in order
to better control nuclear proliferation. 5 This bill was considered
by the Senate Committee on Government Operations, the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, and the House Committee on For-
eign Relations. On August 31, 1976, it was referred back to the
Senate.' The Senate took no action before expiration of the 94th
99. Hearings, Feb. 23, 1976, at 6.
100. It has been stated that the United States supplies approximately 70% of the
world's peaceful nuclear technology. 1976 Hearings 5.
101. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified
in scattered sections of 5, 42 U.S.C.) (Supp. V, 1975)).
102. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
103. S. Rep. No. 94-875, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
104. S: 1439, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
105. Id. § 2(a) (1976).
106. Only the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy reported adversely on the bill. S.
Rep. No. 94-1193, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
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Congress and therefore another bill must be introduced in the
95th Congress.' 7
The bill sought extensive changes within the appropriate fed-
eral agencies, consolidating in the NRC all peaceful nuclear ex-
port licensing and approval authority, and designating the State
Department as the primary agency responsible for negotiating
agreements for nuclear cooperation."' In addition, the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency would be required to submit Nu-
clear Proliferation Assessment Statements on all United States
nuclear agreements to the NRC, the State Department, and
Congress.°9
The Act would also require the President to review all non-
proliferation activities of governmental agencies, to report an-
nually to Congress on efforts to prevent stockpiling of weapons-
grade material, to promote adherence to the NPT, to strengthen
IAEA safeguards, to improve physical security against nuclear
terrorism, to recover stolen or diverted material, and to impose
sanctions against uncooperative nations."' Indeed, the Act goes
so far as to request the President to promote international agree-
ments with other nuclear supplier countries (Canada, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and the So-
viet Union, and others deemed appropriate) for cooperative sup-
ply of nuclear fuel services and for limitations upon sensitive
nuclear exports."'
CONCLUSION
Two types of solutions have been proposed for the problem
of nuclear proliferation. The first attempts to delay the spread of
peaceful nuclear programs because of their adaptibility to nuclear
weapon development. The second endeavors to establish a per-
manent system of controls and sanctions to deal with the
inevitable horizontal proliferation." 2
On a short-term basis, the problem has been approached
through stricter physical security provisions for the protection of
nuclear materials, establishment of regional reprocessing plants,
and continuing nuclear supplier agreements. But the stricter
107. 122 CONG. REC. S18,063 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Senator Percy).
108. S. 1439, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2(a)(5), 4 (1976).
109. Id. § 7.
110. Id. § 8(c).
111. Id. § 12.
112. 1976 Hearings 761.
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physical controls have not been universally applied, regional re-
processing plants remain a future hope, and the United States
will probably maintain its position of control in the group of
nuclear suppliers for a maximum of two more years."' In addi-
tion, the delay in the spread of peaceful nuclear programs raises
the possibility of Third World charges of denial of the benefits of
nuclear energy. Nevertheless, past treaties and the IAEA safe-
guards have been successful in accomplishing two goals: the sepa-
ration of peaceful and military uses of nuclear technology,"' and
the detection of diversion of nuclear materials."'
The long-term solution has not even been approached. Inter-
national nuclear transactions between industrial firms continue
to be negotiated on the basis of ordinary commercial practices,"'
within the restrictions placed on them by their national
governments. West Germany has sold a complete nuclear fuel
cycle to Brazil, and France intends to sell one to Pakistan.",
While the United States has succeeded in halting South Korea's
plan to purchase a reprocessing plant from France,"' the United
States has also promised substantial nuclear assistance to Egypt,
India, and South Korea."' While nuclear material and technology
continue to become more widespread, near-nuclear countries' 9
are constantly faced with the decision whether to maintain a
military option for security reasons. This seems to be the situa-
tion with which Israel is presently faced. The Israeli Government
has implied that it is engaging in nuclear research for military as
well as peaceful purposes.' 2'
Any proposed framework must direct itself to both these
short- and long-term goals. Despite the acceleration of attempts
to control the spread of nuclear material, the reality appears to
be that the possession of nuclear technology by a large group of
countries will arrive sooner than the nuclear suppliers, the IAEA,
and the world community are prepared to handle with adequate
controls and effective sanctions.
Diana L. W. Fernandez
113. 1975 Hearings 5.
114. COMPENDIUM 622.
115. Firmage, supra note 41.
116. COMPENDIUM 90.
117. S. Rep. 94-1193, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
118. Id.
119. 1976 Hearings 6.
120. Twenty-six are generally considered candidates. COMPENDIUM 107.
121. Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1976, § A, at 11, col. 2.
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